1863 (Part II)
 
 

THE UNION STRATEGY AT VICKSBURG: AN OVERVIEW

        By early 1863, the Confederacy had lost most of the Mississippi River to the advancing Union army and navy. The one remaining "stronghold of rebeldom" was Vicksburg, Mississippi. Located on a high bluff overlooking the great river, Vicksburg effectively threatened any Union vessel that tried to pass either north or south.
        Vicksburg was critical to the Confederate cause in another way, for it served as the only remaining place that the western Confederate railroad joined to the eastern Confederate railroad. This railroad corridor allowed critical supplies from Texas and the Deep South to reach the war efforts in the eastern theater, where troops under General Robert E. Lee were winning impressive battles in Virginia.¹
        Rebel forces at Vicksburg were commanded by Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemberton, a West Point graduate whose Pennsylvania roots caused some in the South to question his loyalty to the Confederacy. Although General Pemberton proved to be a loyal officer, he was not a particularly gifted one. In fact, some historians place much of the blame for the fall of Vicksburg on Pemberton's "hesitant, indecisive, and uncoordinated efforts." ²
        General Pemberton was subordinate to General Joseph Eggleston Johnston, the officer in charge of all Confederate forces in the West.³ General Johnston had once commanded Confederate forces in Virginia until a serious injury in the Peninsular Campaign in May of 1862 forced him to resign his command to General Robert E. Lee of Virginia -- an incident that, ironically, proved immensely valuable to rebels fighting in the east.⁴
        General Johnston was not well liked by Confederate President Jefferson Davis, and the feeling was mutual. Their animosity grew largely out of an 1861 dispute over the proper rank of General Johnston in the Confederate Army. Johnston thought he should be designated as the most senior officer in the Confederate Army. President Davis disagreed. Their poor relationship "seemed to guaranteed that any Rebel war effort in Mississippi would be a halting, confused affair." ⁵ Civil War writer L.B. Northrop summarized the Union's numerous attempts to take Vicksburg:

All through the winter of 1862-1863, [Union General Ulysses S.] Grant tried first one [strategy] and then another to get at Vicksburg ... Confederate cavalry wrecked railroads in north Mississippi and compelled Grant's army to abandon an overland campaign against Pemberton. Then the Rebels repulsed a Federal assault at Chickasaw Bluff near Vicksburg. Trying the unusual, Federals attempted to divert the Mississippi River away from Vicksburg, then were thwarted by changing water levels in the stream. Finally, Union efforts to open an all-water route through the bayous north of town were blocked by hastily built Confederate fortifications.⁶

        Exacerbating the Union cause was unusually high water levels throughout the area.⁷
        In late March of 1863, General Grant settled on a new strategy that would prove to be the key to the lock of Vicksburg. Grant's daring plan would march troops down the river on the Louisiana side, cross the river south of Vicksburg, and "without hope of resupply or reinforcement, come up from behind and take the town." ⁸
        Confederate General Pemberton, who incorrectly assumed that the movement of Grant's army was just a diversion to draw his own forces away from Vicksburg, sent only a small army to oppose the Federal armies moving east from the Mississippi River. After Union victories at Port Gibson, Raymond, and Jackson, General Grant next turned his armies due west toward Vicksburg.⁹
        All this time, Confederate General Johnston had urged Pemberton to move most of his army northeast, join his own army, and attack the Federals near Jackson. General Pemberton ignored Johnston's wishes and, on May 15, 1863, Pemberton sent three divisions on an ill-advised and poorly coordinated attempt to strike at Grant's supply lines south and east of Vicksburg. What made this strategy particularly foolish was the fact that since Grant's army was largely living off the rich Mississippi farmland, attacking his supply lines would accomplish almost nothing.¹⁰
        On May 16th, after muddy roads and rain had slowed the rebel advance, Pemberton received a second order to move his army northward to unite with Johnston's. Pemberton obeyed this order, but before his army could accomplish that objective, the Union army met them 20 miles west of Jackson, near a ridge called Champion Hill.¹¹
        After a savage one-day struggle that saw the Union Army victorious, Pemberton's army fled westward to the fortified positions at Vicksburg. The Union victory at Champion Hill kept the armies of Pemberton and Johnston from ever uniting into a powerful fighting force. And it led to the siege that would result in the surrender of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863 -- just 49 days after that.
 
 

SAMUEL KIRKMAN AND THE BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON

Company K -- 77th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment (Colonel David Perkins Grier) -- 2nd Brigade (Colonel William Jennings Landram) -- 10th Division (Brigadier General Andrew Jackson Smith) -- 13th Army Corps (Major General John Alexander McClernand) -- Army of the Tennessee (Major General Ulysses Simpson Grant).¹²

        In the first part of April, the entire 13th Corps marched from Milliken's Bend through the lowlands of Louisiana to a point opposite and below Grand Gulf, Mississippi. On April 30th, the corps was transported across the Mississippi River to Bruinsburg, Mississippi, and immediately moved eastward toward Port Gibson, marching late into the night and arriving there early on the morning of May 1, 1863.^13-A At midnight, fighting broke out as portions of the Union line encountered Confederate positions four miles west of Port Gibson.  The initial encounter lasted three hours before both sides settled down for the night.^13-B   Private William Bentley noted:

There is little question why Grant gave the lead to McClernand's men. The 13th Corps consisted of old and tested regiments from Illinois and other western states. Its division and regimental commanders were among the most courageous men in the Army of the Tennessee, and had proven the fact upon the field of battle.¹⁴

        The Company K Muster Roll for March/April, 1863 showed that Samuel Kirkman was one of these "old and tested" soldiers.¹⁵
        The Battle of Port Gibson, which resumed at about 5 a.m. on Friday, May 1, 1863, was a bitter fight between 8,000 Confederate soldiers commanded by Brigadier General John Bowen and 24,000 Union soldiers commanded by Major General Ulysses Grant. The Confederates, though greatly outnumbered, knew their local topography and took full advantage of it during the battle.¹⁶ General Grant described the difficulty of the local terrain:

In this part of Mississippi ... the hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. This makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one.¹⁷

        Two battles ensued, one along the northerly Bruinsburg Road and the other along the southerly Rodney Road. General McClernand sent the division of General Alvin Hovey, General Eugene Carr and General A.J. Smith (with the 77th Illinois) on the right-hand branch and General Osterhaus' division on the left-hand branch. The Centers Creek Hollow effectively separated the two assaults, making it difficult for one flank to reinforce the other without backtracking. The left branch (Osterhaus' division] felt the greater resistance, and soon other divisions were called in as reinforcements.¹⁸ The highly acclaimed Civil War Historian Edwin C. Bearss described the culmination of fighting:

By now Grant was sending brigade after brigade into the Union lines. The right wing of the Confederate defenses ... [being attacked by Osterhaus' division] ... gave way, and [Confederate General] Bowen, fearing that Union columns would outflank and cut off his troops, ordered retreat.¹⁹

        The Union side reported 131 dead, 719 wounded, and 25 missing at the Battle of Port Gibson. However, had Confederate General Bowen been properly reinforced by troops from Vicksburg, the outcome of the battle of Port Gibson might have been entirely different.^20-A  Landram's Brigade, which included the 77th Illinois, saw minimal action late in the day and suffered only 31 casualties, none of which were from the 77th Illinois.^20-B
 
 

SAMUEL KIRKMAN AND THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION HILL

Company K -- 77th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment (Colonel David Perkins Grier) -- 2nd Brigade (Colonel William Jennings Landram) -- 10th Division (Brigadier General Andrew Jackson Smith) -- 13th Army Corps (Major General John Alexander McClernand) -- Army of the Tennessee (Major General Ulysses Simpson Grant).²¹

        Knowing that Confederate reinforcements were being assembled 45 miles away in Jackson, General Grant made a bold decision that would elevate him to the ranks of greatness. He planned to move his Union army between the separated wings of the rebel force and first defeat one and then the other, taking advantage of the Union army's superior position and its ability to move troops faster than the enemy could react. Grant knew that a direct attack on Vicksburg would be futile without first defeating the nearby rebel forces that could come to General Pemberton's assistance. On May 12th, the Federal army of 44,000 men continued their march eastward, away from Vicksburg.²² Private William Bentley described the surroundings:

We had left the low, flat and swampy lands of Louisiana far behind us. New objects of interest presented themselves as we passed along. We saw the splendid mansions which, in other years, had sheltered the rich, aristocratic proprietors of the soil.²³

        He and fellow soldier Samuel Kirkman passed Rocky Springs, Cuyahoga and Auburn, and on the night of May 15th, they camped near the town of Raymond, Mississippi.^24-A
       On May 12th, the Union's 17th Corps under Major General James McPherson fought a lone Confederate brigade that mistakenly believed they faced a small Union force rather than an entire corps.  Although the rebels initiated the Battle of Raymond with a morning attack, it was ended by a Union counterattack in the early afternoon that drove the greatly outnumbered rebels from the field.^24-B
        Early on the morning of Saturday, May 16, 1863, the 77th Illinois was aroused from their sleep and readied for battle.  At 8 o'clock, the Union army encountered the enemy at Champion Hill, approximately 20 miles west of Jackson.²⁵ Champion Hill is a prominent knoll, about 75 feet high, which offered the rebel forces a good position to block the Union's westward advance on Vicksburg.²⁶ The hill was named for the owner of the land, Sidney S. Champion, whose family lived in a house not far from the fiercest fighting.²⁷
        Brigadier General A.J. Smith's Division (including the 77th Illinois) took position on the left flank of the Union line, facing west. To their right was the Division of Brigadier General Peter Osterhaus, The Union center was held by Brigadier General Alvin Hovey's Division, while Major General McPherson's 17th Corps occupied the Union right.^28-A They faced a line of Confederate soldiers positioned on the ridges in the shape of the numeral seven. The 77th Illinois faced Confederates at the bottom of the "7."  As William Wiley recalled,

[We] left Raymond before daylight, marched about eight miles to Champion Hills where a great battle was fought.  That day the 77 being in reserve was not actively engaged but were run about from one position to another all day where support was needed.  The day being very warm we were badly exhausted and suffered for want of water.  At one time we were ordered to pile our knapsacks to charge a battery but the order was countermanded.^28-B

        General McClernand's 13th Corps first made contact with the Confederate forces at about 9:30 a.m., but did not attack vigorously until 4 1/2 hours later.²⁹ McClernand's four divisions were spread out so much along the battlefield that communication was difficult, hampering the transmission of orders and perhaps forfeiting the opportunity to destroy the enemy force early in the battle.³⁰ McClernand's delay in attacking allowed the rebel forces to shift their forces to the "top of the 7," where the day's bloodiest fighting would occur that afternoon.³¹ It was there that Union divisions commanded by Major General John Logan and Brigadier General Alvin Hovey battled Confederate divisions commanded by Major General Carter Stevenson and Brigadier General John Bowen, respectively.³² Civil War writer L.B. Northrop summarized the climax of battle:

Bowen's Division was among the best combat units in the Confederacy ... Bowen sent these cheering men forward ... 'like ten thousand starving and howling wolves.' Within an hour, Bowen's Rebels had stopped Hovey's Union advance, pushed him back perhaps three-quarters of a mile ... and regained Champion Hill. Only a combination of Union reinforcements from Brigadier General Marcellus Crocker's Division, combined with a shortage of Confederate reserves and ammunition allowed the Union to regain Champion's Hill after forty minutes of intense fighting ... It was soon clear the Confederates were not strong enough to win the battle and if they stayed on the field they were likely to be cut off from their escape route and destroyed. Confederate General Pemberton called for retreat.³³

        The troops of the 77th Illinois, on the far left of the Union line, "fixed their bayonets and charged into the dense forest after the retreating foe." Private William Bentley described the action:

The rebels were seized with panic, and sought safety in flight. In this charge, men were slaughtered without mercy. The ground was covered with the dead and dying. The rebels scattered in every direction and hurried forward to join the main body retreating in the direction of Vicksburg.³⁴

        With the exception of one wounded soldier, the 77th Illinois had emerged from the Battle of Champion Hill unscathed.³⁵ Although Pemberton's Confederates had survived, they had been terribly hurt. As noted historian Edwin Bearss explains:

The Union victory at Champion Hill was decisive. It prevented Pemberton and Johnston from uniting their armies and forced Pemberton back into Vicksburg.³⁶

        The Battle of Champion Hill is considered to be the most severe engagement of the entire Vicksburg campaign. Union casualties totaled 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing.³⁷
        General Pemberton next assembled his Confederate army along the Big Black River, just east of Vicksburg, where they hastily dug a trench in front of a horseshoe bend in the river.³⁸ There they constructed a line of rifle pits and positioned several pieces of artillery.³⁹
        On Sunday, May 17, 1863, in a one-hour fight, a Union force of 10,000 soldiers defeated a rebel force of 4,000. The 77th Illinois was positioned near the Union's left (southern) flank. A cultivated field separated them from the rebel defense lines.⁴⁰ The main credit for the swift Union victory went to one Union brigade (2nd Brigade of the 14th Division).⁴¹ Positioned on the Union's right flank, soldiers from this brigade worked their way around the rebel flank, moved through a narrow opening in the brush and suddenly appeared in the rear of the enemy. The rebel soldiers fled the field in the direction of Vicksburg.⁴²
        The following day, the 77th Illinois resumed their westward march toward Vicksburg. Private William Bentley described their mood:

We marched steadily forward, exulting over the successes of the preceding days and looking forward to fresh victories ... At every step we saw the relics of a panic-stricken army, in the shape of arms and accoutrements, camp and garrison equipage, which they had thrown away ... We now felt confident that the capture of their stronghold was only a question of time and cost ... We encamped at night about four miles in the rear of the rebel works, and waited with anxious impatience for the contest of the morrow.⁴³
 
 
 

 
Company K -- 77th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment (Colonel David Perkins Grier) -- 2nd Brigade (Colonel William Jennings Landram) -- 10th Division (Brigadier General Andrew Jackson Smith) -- 13th Army Corps (Major General John Alexander McClernand) -- Army of the Tennessee (Major General Ulysses Simpson Grant).^44-A

        Major John Bering and Captain Thomas Montgomery of the 48th Ohio, who fought beside the 77th Illinois in several battles, described Vicksburg's defenses:

Vicksburg [was] built on a series of high bluffs, and contained 10,000 inhabitants. The defenses of the city consisted of a chain of forts, at intervals of 800 yards, for a distance of seven miles, both right and left, resting on the Mississippi river, and forming a semi-circle around the city. The rifle pits filled the intervals between the forts. In front of these was a ditch fifteen feet wide and ten feet deep. The works were more formidable than we expected to find them, showing that they were fully prepared to receive us.^44-B

        On May 18, 1863, the Union Army began taking position in front of the Vicksburg defenses. General McClernand's 13th Corps, having traveled along the Jackson railroad, took position on the Union left (southeast of the city of Vicksburg). The Company K Muster Roll for May/June, 1863 showed Samuel Kirkman to be among them.⁴⁵ General McPherson's 17th Corps took position on the Union center (east of Vicksburg), while General Sherman's 15th Corps took position on the Union right (north of Vicksburg).⁴⁶ Had Job Benjamin not deserted nine months earlier, he would have been part of Major General Frederick Steele's Division in General Sherman's 15th Army Corps.⁴⁷
        General Ulysses S. Grant hoped that Union victories at Champion Hill and Big Black River had shattered the Confederate defenses and that the rebels "would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg." ⁴⁸ He didn't realize that Confederate General Pemberton had two fresh divisions guarding the city behind an impressive defense of ravines, earthworks, fallen timber and rifle pits. Historian Victor Hicken describes these defenses:

The deep cuts and irregular hills behind which the enemy had constructed trenches and artillery emplacements looked immensely formidable, even to the most professional eyes.⁴⁹

        On Tuesday, May 19th, the Union Army skirmished with the rebels almost constantly as they positioned themselves for their first assault on the rebel works.⁵⁰ At 2 p.m., General Sherman launched an infantry attack against the Stockade Redan northeast of the city.⁵¹ Historian Edwin Bearss described the obstacles they faced:

Rugged terrain ... felled timber ... and crashing volleys from Mississippi and Louisiana regiments decimated the Union ranks, and their surge was checked [with heavy losses].⁵²

        While Sherman's Corps fought a losing battle at the northeast defense line, McPherson's and McClernand's corps moved within a quarter mile of the rebel works.⁵³ Private William Bentley of the 77th Illinois described their regiment's participation:

We had reached the brow of the hill when the rebels from their forts opened upon our whole line with shell, shrapnel, grape and canister. Hurrying down into the next ravine, we escaped injury. Another high hill was now to be gone over. We went steadily forward up its steep side, in comparative security. When we had reached its brow in full view of the rebel line of works, there poured upon us a shower of shells which made the earth tremble with their terrific explosion. It was on this hill that the loss of our regiment on this day was sustained . . . four killed and twelve wounded. The idea of an immediate assault was abandoned.⁵⁴

        On the following two days -- May 20th and 21st -- the Union Army strengthened its position and constructed roads behind their lines to facilitate the movement of supplies. On the night of May 21st, the troops were issues full rations, including bread and coffee, which pleased everyone.⁵⁵
        General Johnston's Confederate army, which was fifty miles behind the Union positions, still worried General Grant. Johnston's rebel forces were growing, and could conceivably mount an attack upon the Union army within days. Grant wanted to take Vicksburg before General Johnston's rebels could assist the Confederate army at Vicksburg. General Grant explained:

The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save [me from sending] reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State.⁵⁶

        A second frontal attack on Vicksburg was ordered for the following day.  The Union effort involving McClernand's Thirteenth Corps would be directed at three Confederate strongpoints -- the Second Texas Lunette, the Railroad Redoubt, and the Square Fort (listed from north to south).⁵⁷
        A lunette is defined as an earthwork consisting of two sides projecting outward and open at the rear.  A redoubt is defined as an independent earthwork of any shape, usually enclosed or semi-enclosed, and built in advance of a fortified line.  A fort is a completely enclosed earthwork.⁵⁸  Located about a mile and a half east of Vicksburg, the Railroad Redoubt protected the Southern Railroad of Mississippi's passage through the Confederate defenses.  Semi-enclosed and open only in the rear, the Railroad Redoubt projected over 150 yards ahead of the regular defense lines.  [See Photographs]. The interior of the redoubt was divided into three compartments by latereral traverses.  A ditch immediately in front of the redoubt was filled with abatis made by cutting down trees and binding them together with telegraph wire.  One hundred yards beyond this ditch lay a natural ravine that provided an additional defensive element to the already strong position.⁵⁹
        The Union's attack strategy was as follows.  Brigadier General Eugene Asa Carr, commanding the 14th Division of the 13th Corps, would attack the Railroad Redoubt and the Second Texas Lunette.⁶⁰  The attack would be spearheaded by Brigadier General Michael Lawler's 2nd Brigade, which included the 21st Iowa, 22nd Iowa, and 11th Wisconsin infantry regiments.  Supporting the 14th Division's initial assault would be William Landram's 2nd Brigade of the 13th Corps' 10th Division (which included the 77th Illinois, 97th Illinois, 130th Illinois, 19th Kentucky, and 48th Illinois infantry regiments).⁶¹  Although Samuel Kirkman's 77th Illinois was originally planned as supportive of the initial assault, in reality it would emerge later that day as one of the most important Union regiments in the assault upon the Railroad Redoubt.
        Friday, May 22, 1863 dawned clear and calm. At 8 o'clock, the serenity of the day was abruptly disturbed by cannon fire all along the Union lines.⁶²  Twenty-four guns were brought to bear on the Railroad Redoubt, and in the two hours that followed, its tip would be breached and its ditch filled with earth.⁶³  In his three volume work on the Vicksburg Campaign, Edwin Bearss described the assembling of troops during the initial artillery barrage:

Lawler had formed his command in double line of battle in the ravine 150 yards east of its goal -- the 22nd Iowa on the right, supported by the 21st Iowa, and the 11th Wisconsin on the left, trailed by the 97th Illinois of Landram's brigade.  Landram had marshaled his command behind the crest of the ridge in double column of attack -- the 77th Illinois and 48th Ohio on the right, the 19th Kentucky and 130th Illinois on the left.⁶⁴  [See Troop Movement Map].

        The Union attack commenced at five minutes before 10 o'clock.  Lawler's battle line, with bayonets fixed, swept forward toward the redoubt, where they were met by ragged rifle fire.  Lawler's two right-flank regiments -- the 22nd Iowa with the 21st Iowa close behind in support  -- reached the ditch in front of the redoubt, where they were checked by fierce fire from the 30th Alabama, 46th Alabama, and portions of General Thomas Waul's Texas Legion.  Lawler's men advanced through the abatis in the ravine, up the redoubt's slope and into the ditch immediately in front.  About a dozen soldiers entered the redoubt through a breach created by the earlier artillery bombardment and, through furious hand-to-hand combat, drove most of the rebel defenders back across the first traverse. ^65-A  Captain C.N. Lee of the 22nd Iowa recalled the fierce fighting:

. . . the Twenty-second Iowa deployed two companies (A and B) as skirmishers and advanced, followed by the other regiments of the brigade, to the front, determined to dislodge the enemy or die in the attempt. Onward they went through the most galling fire of musketry, grape, and canister, until retarded by an almost impassable abatis. This obstacle overcome, they gained the top of the hill, gathered around, driving the enemy from the rifle-pits in front, and planting the Stars and Stripes on the ramparts. About fifty men of the Twenty-second scaled the walls and entered the fort, driving the enemy before them and taking 15 prisoners. There being a series of rifle-pits in the rear, it was impossible to hold it with such an inadequate force under a terribly destructive fire, and they withdrew, with a loss of nearly half their number killed, wounded, or captured.^65-B

        The 21st Iowa's Regimental Adjutant George Crooke also recalled the hellish fight:

It was a tornado of iron on our left, a hurricane of shot on our right. We passed through the mouth of hell. Every third man fell, either killed or wounded.⁶⁶

        The flag of the 22nd Iowa was the first one placed on the Railroad Redoubt that morning.  Despite their initial success, soldiers of the 21st and 22nd Iowa who had penetrated the parapet could advance no further, due to the storm of bullets originating from the rifle pits behind the redoubt.  A few Union soldiers tried to wriggle across the top of the parapet into the second compartment of the fort, but were either killed or forced to retreat.  Those soldiers who had not entered the redoubt took cover in the ditch.  As the two Iowa regiments gained a toehold within the Railroad Redoubt, Landram's brigades, including the 77th Illinois, prepared to move forward to support their initial attack. ⁶⁷   Lieutenant Colonel Lysander Webb of the 77th Illinois described what would arguably become their regiment's finest hour of the Civil War:

At ten o'clock, our whole line was ordered to charge the rebel works with bayonets fixed. Our Regiment was drawn up in line of battle just behind the brow of the hill over which our charge was to be made. On the next hill frowned the rebel fort, up into the face of which it was our duty to go. Between us was a deep ravine filled with fallen timber and thick undergrowth of brush, brambles and cane.

Ten o'clock, the hour we had so anxiously waited for, finally came. 'Forward the Seventy-seventh,' was the word. The men sprang to their arms and moved up and over the brow of the hill. Ten or fifteen feet over the brow, the storm opened upon us terribly from the right, left and front, making sad havoc in our ranks. Down into the abatis of fallen timber and brush we went, and commenced the struggle of the ascent, our comrades falling thickly on all sides of us. Still up the hill we pressed, through the brambles and brush, over the dead and dying -- up, up we struggled, over logs, into ditches, clinging here to a bush to keep from falling backwards, and there to a thorny bramble - oh! that was a half hour which may God grant we shall not be called upon to experience its like again. Finally, the fort is reached.⁶⁸

        Soldiers of the Landram's brigage, including the 77th Illinois, were unable to return the rebel's murderous fire, since their Union comrades from Lawler's brigade were also in their line of fire.  Instead, they took position in the ditch immediately to the right of the Iowans.⁶⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Lysander Webb of the 77th Illinois described the action:

Panting for breath, and with only a fragment of the regiment for their support, a dauntless dash was made for the fort. A part of our men went over into the ditch surrounding the fort, a few got through a port-hole upon the inside . . . 'Plant our colors upon the ramparts,' Colonel Grier shouted ⁷⁰

        One brave soldier planted the regimental colors of the 77th Illinois alongside those of the 22nd Iowa.  Soldiers of the 21st Iowa, 22nd Iowa, and 77th Illinois savagely clawed and fought their way up the steep slope of the Railroad Redoubt.⁷¹  Few, if any, soldiers from the 77th Illinois actually entered the fort, but they were still in a dangerous and life-threatening position.  Early that afternoon, Confederate reinforcements, largely from the 30th Alabama, were brought forward to drive the Yankees from the ditch fronting the redoubt and to seal the breach in their lines.⁷²  On the Union side, reinforcements came from the 48th Ohio and 130th Illinois regiments.  The colors of the 48th Ohio were raised beside those of the 22nd Iowa and 77th Illinois.⁷³ Lieutenant Colonel Lysander Webb of the 77th Illinois described the subsequent action:

Fifteen or twenty minutes after reaching the fort, the 48th Ohio and 130th Illinois of our brigade came to our support, but in the mean time the enemy had been reinforced at that point, and we were too weak to attempt to carry their inner work. Unsupported for ten hours, we kept up the fight amid the enfilading fire of rebel cannon and musketry. I wish it were in my power to do justice to the immortal heroism of the noble men and officers of the 77th Regiment, upon whom fell the principal brunt of the fight, who, during those ten thrilling hours, defended the position which they had, after such a fearful struggle obtained. Comrade after comrade fell around us; hotter and hotter grew the rebel fire as regiment after regiment came to their support, but we would not give back. Reinforcements were promised us, and most anxiously, but in vain, we watched for them.^74-A

        Soldiers from the 48th Ohio described the same desparate struggle:

We were now exposed to an enfilading fire from the right and left, which was thinning our ranks at a fearful rate. We were left there to contend against great odds, without any assistance whatever. At 4 p.m. the rebels massed their troops on our front, and attacked us with great fury, and re-took the fort, capturing the colors and fifty men of the 77th Ills. Ike Carmin, one of our color guards, with a bayonet-wound in the leg, clung to our flag and saved it from sharing the same fate. This was the signal for a second attack on both sides. Another charge was ordered all along the line. It was a glorious sight to see our troops advancing in plain view over the hills, to our assistance. But as soon as they got within range of the rebel fire, they were mown down and almost annihilated. So destructive was the concentrated fire of the enemy, that not a single man of those sent to reinforce us reached our line.^74-B

        Historian Victor Hicken described one heroic effort undertaken by soldiers of the 77th Illinois:

The fighting here was worse than at any spot along the entire line. Having no artillery support, some of the men of the 77th Illinois carried a small cannon forward by hand, and fired it through the embrasure into the enemy works.⁷⁵

        Thirty-five years later, Corporal Winthop D. Putnam, Corporal from Company A, was issued the Congressional Medal of Honor for this heroic action.⁷⁶
        Confederate generals, well aware of the importance of the redoubt, ordered in reinforcements to retake their position at all cost.  As an extra incentive, General S.D. Lee offered the enemy colors to the command that captured any of the three Union colors that were now raised on the Railroad Redoubt parapet. ⁷⁷  At 5:30 p.m., the rebels surged forward.  The colors of the 22nd Iowa and 48th Ohio were successfully removed amidst the flood of rebel soldiers, but the regimental colors of the 77th Illinois were captured and subsequently delivered to the victorious Texans of Waul's Legion. ⁷⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Lysander Webb of the 77th Illinois described the sad ending to a long day of hard fighting:

        Nearly half our men were either killed or wounded, and all of us nearly exhausted by the day's fight, when, at about six o'clock, the enemy rallied in force, made a rush with fixed bayonets, and for a few seconds we thought all was lost. Our men fell back in confusion, but only some twelve feet. I think the prompt action of the officers of the regiment saved it from rout and slaughter. We rallied the men, checked the advance of the rebels and held our own. They captured our regimental banner in the sortie, which had floated all day over their fort and had been shot to shreds.⁷⁹

        Upon hearing that his men may have broken the Confederate defenses, General McClernand informed General Grant of their success and pleaded for reinforcements. Upon receiving McClernand's note, Grant turned to General Sherman beside him and said, "I don't believe a word of it." Grant was so used to hearing the boasts of McClernand that he had trouble believing this latest news. Sherman reminded Grant that the note was official and should not be ignored. Reluctantly, Grant ordered an additional division of men to reinforce Landram's section of the line.⁸⁰  However, when this division reported to General McClernand, instead of ordering it as one unit into battle, he split the division into three parts, with only one ordered to bolster the forces that had penetrated the Railroad Redoubt.⁸¹  Commanded by Colonel George Boomer, this four-regiment brigade quickly made their way across the ridge and descended into the bottom of a hollow.⁸²  Unfortunately for the men in blue, the abatis and other obstructions in the ravines caused confusion and forced the commanders to waste valuable time reforming their lines in preparation for the impending assault.  This lost time allowed the Confederates to shift their forces to meet the new challenge.⁸³  Boomer's brigade added little to the Union effort, other than to its casualty list.  In the bitter words of Sergeant Aaron Dunbar of the 93rd Illinois, "It was much like marching men to their graves in line of battle." ⁸⁴ Adding to the Union woes was the unfortunate death of Colonel Boomer himself, who was struck in the head by a rifle shot and mortally wounded just as the assault was about to commence.  His successor, Colonel Holden Putnam of the 93rd Illinois, noticed the dramatically increased rebel resistance, believed that the assault would be suicidal, and received permission from this commander to cancel it.⁸⁵
        Union soldiers, including those of the 77th Illinois, still continued to hold the ditch.  To dislodge their foe, rebel soldiers began to throw, lob, and roll various sized artillery shells (in a manner akin to modern-day hand grenades) upon their enemy.^86-A  As explained by Terrence Winschel, author of The Civil War Diary of a Common Soldier, these devices were either glass bottles filled with gun powder and lead balls or a more sophisticated invention consisting of a cast iron sphere containing gun powder and surrounded by a matrix of percussion caps, any one of which could detonate the explosive.^86-B  Winschel's "common soldier" -- William Wiley -- describes what would prove to be the "final straw" in the Union assult:

Our men in the ditch had a fearful time.  The rebels lit handgrenades and fuse shells and threw them over among them which exploded and killed a great many of them until our men got to grabbing them up and throwing them back before they would exploded which made them a little more careful how they throwed them over.  But they would cut the fuse short that some would explode before our men could throw them back.^86-C

Historian Victor Hicken summarized the May 22nd assault:

Either because the attack was doomed to failure by the staunchness of the Confederate defense or because of the delay in ordering reinforcements to McClernand, the May 22nd assault was a terrible failure. The attacking regiments were torn apart and hurled back ... Still, those staunch Illinois and Iowa soldiers ... maintained their slender hold upon the enemy forts until late in the day.⁸⁷

        Although the rebel defenses at Vicksburg were severely tested by this second major Union assault in four days, they did not break.  The Confederate counterattack succeeded; the Union assault had been beaten back. In the day's fighting, the Union army sustained 3,199 casualties. The 77th Illinois suffered 130 casualties (20 dead, 86 wounded, and 24 missing) -- a greater number than any other Illinois regiment and second only to the 22nd Iowa, which suffered 164 casualties.⁸⁸

        Another tribute to the bravery exhibited by Union soldiers that day came from the acclaimed Civil War researcher Bell Irvin Wiley, who observed:

Certainly the Confederates had no braver soldiers than those blue-clad heroes who responded to Grant's order to charge the works at Vicksburg on May 22, 1863.⁸⁹

       Confederate General Pemberton was confident.  With a second major Union assault successfully resisted, he knew that Grant would have no choice but to resort to seige operations.  Pemberton knew that his rebel army had ample food and supplies to sustain them until General Joe Johnston's army could come to their aid.  It was only a matter of time, he thought, until his Union foe could be driven away and, with a little luck, perhaps even defeated.⁹⁰
        The enormous losses of the day brought much sadness and anger to the Union officers. Grant and others were very upset with General McClernand, believing that many of the casualties were caused by McClernand's poor judgement in asking for reinforcements when there was (in Grant's opinion) little hope for success.⁹¹
        General McClernand's reputation would go from bad to worse. Hearing the rumors against him, McClernand wrote a long and floridly written congratulatory order to his own 13th Army Corps, dated May 30th. In his order, McClernand blamed the failure of the May 22nd assault on Grant's slowness to reinforce his troops. He also claimed a disproportionate share of the success for the entire Mississippi campaign, offending other corps commanders in the process.⁹²
        But General McClernand's greatest error was simply not following military regulations. According to these regulations, McClernand should have submitted this letter directly to General Grant. Instead, McClernand sent it directly to several western newspapers without Grant's knowledge.⁹³ McClernand's breach of regulations was all that Grant and fellow officers needed to finally rid themselves of McClernand. On June 15, 1863, Special Orders Number 164 relieved Major General John A. McClernand from duty. Major General Edward Otho Cresap Ord assumed command of the 13th Army Corps.⁹⁴
        Realizing that Vicksburg could not be taken by force, General Grant and his Union troops settled in for a siege. All ammunition and food lines to Vicksburg (what few remained) were cut. Thousands of shells were hurled into the city and Union engineers pushed 13 "approach trenches" toward the Confederate defenses.^95-A  Private William Wiley described these efforts:

Heavy details were mady each day to work in the trenches and do picket duty in the trenches already dug.  We soon got our trenches up so near to the rebel forts that they could fire down on our workmen from the top of their works.  But our Yankee ingenuity overcame this difficulty by making long rollers or tubes of bamboo canes about as large as sugar hogheads but longer and filling them with cotton and rolling them in front of us as a breast work.^95-B

        Pushed by hand by Union soldiers digging approach trenches, these large, barrel-shaped devices were known as sap rollers.^95-C
        To conserve ammunition, Confederate General Pemberton restricted the firing of rebel cannons. To escape the Union shelling, Vicksburg residents dug caves in the hillside for shelter. On June 25, 1863, Union mines were exploded under the Third Louisiana Redan (north of the 77th Illinois' original position).⁹⁶ General Grant ordered A.J. Smith's Division, including the 77th Illinois, to sleep on their arms that night, and be ready for any emergency. Grant hoped that the Union assault, led by soldiers of the 17th Army Corps, would be successful, and that by daybreak the soldiers of A.J. Smith's Division would be needed to complete the capture of Vicksburg. But the order never came. The Union assault failed.⁹⁷
       By late-June, despite their stubborn defiance, Pemberton's Confederate army was in a desperate situation. Other Confederate forces were too occupied with Union forces in middle Tennessee (which would ultimately lead to the Battle of Chickamauga in September) to assist in relieving the defenders of Vicksburg.⁹⁸ General Joe Johnston, whose army now largely consisted of poorly equipped new recruits, advised Pemberton and President Jefferson Davis that Vicksburg should be abandoned to save the army from capture. Johnston's strategy was ignored. Pemberton's army held on, with less and less food and supplies for both soldier and resident alike.⁹⁹ By late June, almost half the Confederate forces defending Vicksburg were either on the sick list or in the hospital. Daily rations were down to one biscuit per soldier. With conditions fast deteriorating, the rebel army was becoming ripe for mutiny.¹⁰⁰
        On July 3rd, Pemberton met with General Grant to discuss terms for possible surrender. Grant originally proposed unconditional surrender, which Pemberton refused. That night, however, Grant softened the terms a bit, and on Saturday, July 4, 1863, the 87th anniversary of American independence, Vicksburg surrendered to the Union army.¹⁰¹
        Private William Bentley eloquently summed up the Vicksburg campaign:

Vicksburg! What thrilling recollections cluster about the name! The weary march -- the hunger, thirst and fatigue -- the rapid and resistless advance -- the successful investment of the rebel works by an impenetrable line of troops -- the bloody, hard-fought battles -- the daring but unsuccessful assault -- the high-noon and midnight labor in the trenches -- the watchfulness and weariness -- the laborious and long-continued siege -- the final capture of the place on the ever-memorable Fourth of July -- these, and similar events, will ever be remembered with patriotic pride by all who participated in them.¹⁰²

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© 2002 by Bart Benjamin
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1863 (Part lI) FOOTNOTES

1.  L.B. Northrop, "A Hill of Death," Civil War Times Illustrated, May/June, 1991, p. 26.
2.  Ibid., p. 30.
3.  Ibid., p. 28.
4.  Ward, p. 139.
5.  Northrop, p. 28.
6.  Ibid.
7.  Boatner, p. 871.
8.  Ward, p. 212.
9.  Northrop, p. 29.
10.  Ibid., p. 30.
11.  Ibid.
12.  Johnson and Buel, III, 546.
13-A.  from Adjutant General's Report, page 682; Illinois at Vicksburg. page 239; Bentley, p. 134.
13-B.  Winschel, p. 45 (footnote 6).
14.  Hicken, p. 155.
15.  from Co. K Muster Roll, from the National Archives.
16.  Edwin C. Bearss, "Port Gibson," in The Civil War Battlefield Guide, ed. Frances H. Kennedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), p. 136.
17.  Grant, pp. 322-323.
18.  Ibid., p. 323.
19.  Bearss, "Port Gibson," p. 138.
20-A.  Ibid., pp. 136 and 138.
20-B.  Winschel, p. 45 (footnote 7).
21.  Johnson and Buel, III, 546.
22.  Boatner, p. 874.
23.  Bentley, p. 138.
24-A.  Ibid., p. 139.
24-B.  Winschel, p. 47 (footnote 11).
25.  Bentley, p. 139.
26.  Boatner, p. 875.
27.  Northrop, p. 31.
28-A.  Bentley, p. 139.
28-B.  Winschel, p. 47.
29.  Boatner, p. 875.
30.  Northrop, p. 31; Boatner, p. 875.
31.  Boatner, p. 875.
32.  Edwin C. Bearss, "The Vicksburg Campaign and Siege," in The Civil War Battlefield Guide, ed. Frances H. Kennedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), pp. 142 and 144.
33.  Northrop, pp. 33 and 62.
34.  Bentley, p. 140.
35. Illinois at Vicksburg. p. 242.
36.  Edwin C. Bearss, "Champion Hill," in The Civil War Battlefield Guide. ed. Frances H. Kennedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), p. 145.
37.  Ibid.
38.  Boatner, p. 876.
39.  Bentley, p. 141.
40.  Johnson and Buel, III, 512. (map)
41.  Bentley, p. 142; Johnson and Buel, III, 547.
42.  Bentley, p. 142.
43.  Ibid., pp. 143-144.
44-A.  Johnson and Buel, III, 546.
44-B.  Bering and Montgomery, from the website created by Don D. Worth and Stephen E. Williams at
http://www.48ovvi.org/index.html, Chapter XI.
45.  from Co. K Muster Roll, from the National Archives.
46.  Hicken, p. 162.
47.  Reid, p. 441.
48.  Grant, p. 354.
49.  Hicken, p. 169.
50.  Grant, p. 354.
51.  excerpted from a Vicksburg National Military Park brochure written and published by the National Park Service.
52.  Bearss, "The Vicksburg Campaign and Siege," p. 132.
53.  Ibid.
54.  Bentley, pp. 149-150.
55.  Grant, p. 355.
56.  Ibid.
57.  Warren E. Grabau, Ninety-Eight Days, (Knoxville, Tennessee: The University of Tennessee Press, 2000), p. 376.
58.  Ibid., p. xxviii.
59.  Ibid., p. 375.
60.  Edwin Cole Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg (Volume III), (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside House, Inc., 1986), pp. 823 and 863.
61.  Ibid., pp. 824 and 862-863.
62.  Bentley, p. 150.
63.  Grabau, p. 376.
64.  Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, p. 824.
65-A.  Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg (Volume III), pp. 824-825; Grabau, p. 377.
65-B.  War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. U.S. Government, 1900, Vol XXIV, Part 2, p. 244.
66.  Korn, p. 130.
67.  Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, pp. 824-825; Grabau, p. 380.
68.  Bentley, pp. 151-152.
69.  Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, p. 826; Grabau, p.378.
70.  Bentley, p. 152.
71.  Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, p. 826.
72.  Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, pp. 826 and 849; Burden, Jeffry C., Bloody Fight in Vain, online article from America's Civil War
73.  Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, p. 849.
74-A. Bentley, pp. 152-153.
74-B.  Bering and Montgomery, from the website created by Don D. Worth and Stephen E. Williams at
http://www.48ovvi.org/index.html, Chapter XI.
75.  Hicken, p. 172.
76.  U.S. Army Center of Military History website at www.army.mil/cmh-pg/mohciv2.htm.
77.  Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, p. 849.
78.  Ibid., p. 850.
79.  Bentley, p. 153.
80.  Hicken, p. 174; Sherman, p. 352.
81.  Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, p. 847.
82.  Grabau, p. 379; Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, p. 851.
83.  Kiper, p. 263.
84.  Korn, p. 132.
85.  Grabau, p. 379; Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, p. 851.
86-A.  Bearss, The Campaign for Vicksburg, p. 851.
86-B.  Winschel, p. 51 (footnote 18).
86-C.  Ibid., p. 51.
87.  Hicken, p. 174.
88.  Hicken, p. 174; Illinois at Vicksburg, page 242 gives the 77th Illinois casualties as 19 killed, 85 wounded, and 26 missing.
89.  Wiley, p. 361.
90.  Grabau, p. 382.
91.  Hicken, p. 175.
92.  Bentley, pp. 164-170.
93.  Hicken, pp. 176-177.
94.  Bentley, p. 170.
95-A.  Bearss, "The Vicksburg Campaign and Siege," p. 134.
95-B.  Winschel, p. 57.
95-C.  Ibid., p. 57 (footnote 28).
96.  Bearss, "The Vicksburg Campaign and Siege," p. 134.
97.  Bentley, pp. 175-176.
98.  Bowman, p. 114.
99.  Boatner, pp. 441 and 876.
100.  Ward, pp. 240-241.
101.  Bearss, "The Vicksburg Campaign and Siege," p. 134.
102.  Bentley, p. 195.

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Last Updated: February 3, 2002